




RECONSTRUCTING THE NAKAYAMA PROPOSAL 1991 : 










The content of this paper is focused on the Nakayama Proposal 1991, an initiative of multilateral 
security dialogue following the end of the Cold War in 1990. The proposalwassubmitted by Japan’s 
Former Foreign Minister Tarou Nakayama towards the Association of Southeast Asian Nation 
(ASEAN)on July 22, 1991. Prior to 1990,in legitimate consideration of Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution 
and The Yoshida Doctrine, Japan’s policies towards ASEAN were limited only upon commercial field 
likewise economic trade as well as cultural exchange. However, Japan altered its foreign policy in 
1990s and started to consider an initiative of multilateral security dialogue. One of them was the 
Nakayama Proposal 1991. 
 
It is said that the Nakayama Proposal 1991 was a notable initial phase related to the establishment of 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), one of the instruments of security-community in the Asia Pacific 
region. Nevertheless, there were several constraints facing this initiative, including objections to 
Nakayama’s idea of the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) by Indonesian and Malaysian Foreign 
Minister, Alatas and Abdullah.Thus, this paper tries to resconstruct Japan’s behind-the-scenes 
worksin advance of the submission of the Nakayama Proposal by Japan’s Prime Minister and Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) officials in order to explore the reason behind ASEAN’s negative 
respondsemploying Deutsch’s concept of actors’ mobility and transactions multiplicity. By analyzing 
Japan and ASEAN countries’ balance of transactions through 1990 to 1991, it is remarked that the lack 
of direct consultation regarding the SOM concept prior to the proposal’s submission was the reason 
behind ASEAN’s refusal. 
 







On August 8 1967, a regional organization named ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations) was 
established in Bangkok1. Japan’s first recognition for the organization was on 1971 when Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration proclamated by the ASEAN. This recognition was also strengthen by Japanese Diplomatic 
Bluebook (Waga Gaikou no Kinkyo) 1972 edition. It is mentioned in the book that Japan has finally 
recognized the ASEAN as main regional organization in Southeast Asia2. 
The beginning of Japan-ASEAN diplomatic relations was marked by The Synthetic Rubber Forum in 1973. 
Starting from this forum, Japan and ASEAN thereupon commenced their formal discussion through 
ASEAN-Japan forum3. Simply put, since the 1973 onwards, Japan’s foreign policies towards the ASEAN 
were only focused in commercial affairs such as economics or cultural exchanges and tended to avoid 
security and multilateral issues. This can be indicated from two general situations. First, most of Japan’s 
Prime Ministers’ policies were emphasized on Japan’s demilitarization. For instance, as stated by Prime 
Minister Takeo Fukuda in his political speech in Manila, August 18 1977, Japan would not play any role in 
international military affairs4. This speech is also known as The Fukuda Doctrine. Second, the 1st until the 
12th ASEAN-Japan Forum agenda, which were dominated by commercial sectors such as economics, 
trade and cultural exchange5. 
However, by the end of the cold war in 1990s, Japan began to consider security-relatedpolicies as 
indicated from its interest in initiating multilateral stability forum in the Asia Pacific region. On July 22 
1991, Japan through its Foreign Affair Minister, Tarou Nakayama, submitted a proposal regarding 
regional stability and security cooperation in the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) held 
in Kuala Lumpur6. Unfortunately,ASEAN’s respond towards this proposal was indifferent and tended to 
reject Minister’s notion7. 
The Nakayama Proposal 1991 was an idea of future security-community in Asia Pacific Region by the end 
of The Cold War in 1990s. In particular, The Nakayama Proposal had accelerated the formation of the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) by promoting the idea of a multilateral security dialogue connected with 
the ASEAN8. Not to mention about the initial responds fromthe ASEAN to the proposal, this policy was 
basically a remarkable beginning for a security-community establishment in the region. Thus, this paper 
will try to break-down behind-the-scenesdiplomacyof the Nakayama Proposal 1991 and examine the 
reason behind ASEAN’s negative responds towards the proposal. 
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To examine the reason behind ASEAN’s negative responds, this paper will mainly employ security 
community theory proposed by Karl Deutsch. It is important to adopt this theory since the Nakayama 
Proposal 1991 had indirectly encouraged the ASEAN to establish ARF, one of security-community 
instruments in Asia Pacific. According to Deutsch, a security-community is a group of people which has 
become integrated. Integration, is the attainment within the territory, of a sense of community and of 
institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable 
expectations of peaceful change among its population9.  
Deutsch’s concept of security-community was proposed in 1950. However, it has become fashionable 
once again after the end of the cold war since it can be attributed to development in international 
relations theory that are exploring the role of identity, norms, and the social basis of global politics10. The 
Nakayama Proposal 1991 was one of Japan’s initial foreign policy facing the end of the cold war in 1990s. 
Therefore, it is assumed that Deutsch’s theory is compatible enough to examine the proposal. 
There are two types of security-community, amalgamated and pluralistic. The former is a formal merger 
of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some types of common 
government after amalgamation. This common government may be unitary or federal.For instance, the 
integration of several states in North America under the jurisdiction of United States. The latter is a 
security-community type which has two or more legal independence of separate governments. Each 
separate governmental units form a security-community without being merged. It has two or more 
supreme decision-making centers. The establishment of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 
during the cold war is one of pluralistic type of security-community11. 
According to Deutsch, there are certain requirements for the establishment of the security-community. 
In this paper, two essential conditions will be emphasized. First requirement is mobility of persons.One 
of the conditions present in all our cases of successful security-community is the mobility of persons 
among the main units, at least in the politically relevant strata. It is quite possible that this condition may 
be essential for the success of integration.  Full-scale mobility of persons has followed every successful 
security-community in modern times immediately upon its establishment. Deutsch’s findings infer that 
the free mobility of commodities and money or other economic ties are not essential for political 
integration. Mobility of persons suggests that in this field of politics persons may be more important 
than either goods or money12.  
Multiplicity and balance of transactions is the second essential prior requirements. It is appeared that 
the establishment of a security-community requires a fairly wide range of different common functions 
and services, together with different institutions and organizations to carry them out. Further, it 
apparently requires a multiplicity of ranges of common communications and transactions and their 
institutional counterparts. The first of them in concerned with the balance in the flow of communications 
and transactions between the political units that are to be amalgamated, and particularly with the 
balance of rewards between the different participating territories. In the course of studying cases of 
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successful integration, it is apparently important for each of the participating territories of population to 
gain some valued services or opportunities. It is also seemed important that each at least sometimes 
take the initiative in the process, or initiate some particular phase or contribution, and that some major 
symbol or representative of each territory or population should be accorded explicit respect by the 
others. The second condition seems essential that they should balance over some period of time. 
Sometimes this was accomplished by alternating flows or by an interchange of group roles13. 
The Submission of The Nakayama Proposal 1991 
As previously discussed, Foreign Minister Nakayama proposed an initiative regarding security issues in 
Asia Pacific region during the ASEAN-PMC held in Kuala Lumpur 199114. Japan started participating in the 
PMC since 1978 to 1993. In 1991, the ASEAN-PMC was held in Kuala Lumpur, July 22-24. The participants 
of this PMC were 6 ASEAN countries, Japan, Australia, US, New Zealand, Canada, the delegation from 
European Community and South Korea. In addition to these participants, delegations of Uni Soviet and 
China were also invited as observers for the first time. In the first day of the conference, Japan Foreign 
Minister Nakayama delivered his major political speech during the general session. In the second and 
third day, private plenary sessions were held15. 
 
Outline of The Nakayama Proposal 1991 
In his speech, Nakayama mentioned several issues regarding Japan’s international relation. First, he 
enhanced political cooperation as well as economic cooperation in Asia Pacific. He then supported the 
presence of US military in Asia Pacific and peace process in Cambodia16. Japan also emphasized in which 
it would not perform any military role in the region and expressed its disagreement regarding CSCE-like 
initiatives in the region17.  
 




The ASEAN-PMC (Post-Ministerial Conference) was a series of annual meetings between ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
and their counterparts known as ‘dialogue partners’. The original participants of PMC included the US, Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, the EU and Japan. These days, South Korea, China and India were also added to the list of 
the official dialogue partners. The primary agenda of PMC was economic issues, while political issues formed part 
of its agenda in the 1980s. The ASEAN-PMC was regularly held following the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) 
every mid-year. These meetings had been initiated gradually since the mid 1970s. The PMC was divided into two 
sections: general session and private plenary meeting. However, from 1994 onwards, the PMC was replaced by 
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In addition to previous points, Nakayama suggested the ASEAN to establish a regional dialogue regarding 
security issues as stated in his following speech: 
 
“...If there is anything to add to the mechanisms and frameworks for cooperation in the three 
fields of economic cooperation, diplomacy and security, the first would be a forum for political 
dialogue where friendly countries in this region could engage in frank exchanges of opinion on 
matters of mutual interest.  
 ...I believe it would be meaningful and timely to use the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference as a 
process for mutual reassurance among us. In order for such dialogue to be effective, it might be 
advisable to organise senior officials’ meeting, which would then report its deliberations to the 
ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference  for further discussion.”18 
 
As stated in the speech, Nakayama promoted not only a regional multilateral security dialogue, but also 
proposed a direct mechanism to execute the dialogue, named Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM). The 
proposal of establishing a SOM under the ASEAN-PMC was the most important, yet controversial point in 
the Nakayama Proposal19. 
Responds towards The Nakayama Proposal 1991 
The submission of the Nakayama Proposal, particularly SOM mechanism, led various disparate responds 
from countries attending the ASEAN-PMC. Negative responds came from the ASEAN countries and the 
US. On the other hand, Australia stated its agreement towards Japan’s initiative. 
As reported by several Japan local newspapers, ASEAN reaction to the Nakayama Proposal was rather 
careful. There were no ASEAN countries which stated direct agreement towards the proposal20. In the 
plenary session of the PMC, the ASEAN clearly stated: 
 
“We don’t need to establish any officials’ meeting. The idea from Mr. Nakayama is enough. Let 
ASEAN consider about the detail of the meeting’s mechanism.”21 
 
This general statement from the ASEAN was also supported by official press statements from the ASEAN 
countries’ foreign ministers. Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas confirmed: 
 
“…we cannot establish a working group on security. People will have a wrong impression as if the 
PMC is becoming a security forum. It should be a general forum and we have no problem with 
security talk along with other issues. You see the difference.” 
Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah strengthened Alatas’ statement: 
“I don’t think we need to use the ASEAN-PMC as a venue to talk about security issues, the PMC 
should not be constrained to discuss security only.”22 
Abdullah’s Vice-Foreign Minister, Kamil then added as per following: 
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“In July 21, 6 countries of the ASEAN had actually discussed about the possibility of the 
establishment of any multilateral security dialogue in the region, and we came with a conclusion 
which states that the time and mechanism are not yet ripe to realize such ideas.”23 
Albeit the Philippines Foreign Minister Manglapus expressed its appreciation to Japan’s initiative, none 
of the ASEAN countries conveyed its direct agreement to the Nakayama Proposal. 
The US attended the ASEAN-PMC from the second day. However, the US through its Secretary of State 
James Baker implicitly mentioned its disagreement to the Nakayama Proposal: 
 
“We ought to be careful about changing those arrangements and discarding them from something 
else unless we’re absolutely certain that the something else is better and will work.” 
 
On the contrary, Australia Foreign Minister Evans stated its positivity: 
 
“We will support the Nakayama Proposal. ASEAN side might be careful towards this proposal, but 
it doesn’t mean they reject it completely”24 
Despite the ARF as one of the security-community instruments in Asia Pacific was established in 1993, it 
did not effectively fulfill the real target of Foreign Minister Nakayama. As admitted by Nakayama to 
Japan’s accompanying reporters during the PMC, Japan will aim to the establishment of the SOM in the 
ASEAN-PMC next year25. In fact, ASEAN started the ARF establishment process from 1993 to 1994 instead 
of 1992. 
ReconstructingThe Nakayama Proposal 1991 
This section will illustrate behind-the-scenes works of Japan between January 1990 until July 1991 prior 
to the submission of the Nakayama Proposal in Kuala Lumpur. In particular, behind-the-scenes works can 
be defined as actors’ mobilitiesandbalance of transactions performed by Japan in order to seek mutual 
understanding related to the content of the Nakayama Proposal from its diplomatic partners, notably the 
ASEAN countries. According to author’s findings, Director General of the Information Analysis, Research 
and Planning Bureau MoFA Yukio Satou, Foreign Minister Tarou Nakayama and Prime Minister Toshiki 
Kaifu were the most important actors during behind-the-scenes processes. 
Albeit Deutsch did not mention precisely concerning the ideal range of time each side should work on 
behind-the-scenes processes, in accordance with two following reasons, it is considered that 1990 and 
1991 were the most crucial stage of Japan’s diplomacy. First, it is very essential to see the tenure of 
Prime Minister Kaifu as well as Foreign Minister Nakayama as main actors in this proposal. Both of them 
served each position from August 1989 to November 1991. However, the end of 1989 cannot be 
considered as an essential year since the idea of new security dialogue had not yet appeared from both 
sides, Japan and ASEAN. We can infer this condition from The Eleventh Japan-ASEAN Forum held in 
Manila, October 3, 1989 where international economic likewise trade, commodity, industry and finance 
were the only main issues being discussed26. Second, Japan began to multiply its political maneuvers to 
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ASEAN in the issues of regional security only by the beginning of 199027.Japan’s reconsideration of the 
idea of regional security multilateralism began when Yukio Satou assumed the position of Director 
General of the Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau at MoFA in January 1990. Under 
Satou, MoFA began to articulate a new concept of regional security that would enable Japan to take the 
initiative in promoting a region-wide security forum28. 
January 1990 – December 1990 
In order to ascertain actors’ mobilities and balance of transactions prior to the submission of the 
proposal, each event will be arranged chronologically. 
Table 1. Japan’s mobility and transactions with ASEAN countries in 1990. 
No. Year 1990 Events 
1 January, 4 
Foreign Minister Nakayama visited Malaysia. In this meeting, 
Malaysian Foreign Minister Abu Hasan conveyed its 
statement for Japan to take over Vietnam’s power 
domination in the region. Nakayama welcomed Malaysia’s 
statement.29 
2 July, 27-29 
Nakayama attended ASEAN-PMC 1990 in Jakarta where the 
main discussion was focused on peace process in Cambodia. 
On July 28, Nakayama delivered his major speech which 
mainly emphasized the importance of ASEAN for Japan’s 
diplomacy.30 
3 Beginning of August 
Nakayama paid a visit to Bangkok and Laos to meet Prime 
Minister Kaysone and discuss economic cooperation and 
peace in Cambodia.31 
4 September, 22-25 
Nakayama together with Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas 
decided to co-sponsor an informal dinner and dialogue of 
Asia Pacific Foreign Ministers at the opening session of the 
UN General Assembly in New York. This informal meeting 
mainly focused on the exchange of any opinions regarding 
regional security issues. Japan acquired understanding from 
US regarding Japan’s further contribution in East-West 
diplomacy as well as ASEAN’s understanding regarding 
Japan’s SDF dispatch in UN Peace-keeping Operation.32 
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January 1991 – July 1991 
Compared to 1990, balance of communications between Japan and ASEAN countries in1991 multiplied 
significantly as shown by the following figure. 
 
 
Table 2. Japan’s mobility and transactions with ASEAN countries in 1990. 
No Year 1991 Events 
1 January, 12-20 
Prime Minister Kaifu visited 5 ASEAN countries to discuss the 
Gulf Crisis.33 
2 March, 15 
Kaifu and Nakayama paid visits to ASEAN countries, US and 
Soviet Union to emphasize following things: (1) Build closer 
relations with US, (2) Construct new relation with Uni Soviet 
following Gorbachev’s visits to Japan, (3) Reconstruct 
diplomacy in Asia Pacific.34 
3 End of April 
Kaifu visited Malaysia. Along with Prime Minister Mahatir 
discussed the planning of EAEG (East Asian Economic 
Group).35 
4 May, 3 
Kaifu paid a visit to Singapore. Prime Minister Gou expressed 
its insecurity if Japan and China take over the balance of 
power in Asia Pacific. Kaifu then emphasized that Japan will 
not be a military power anymore. However, Kaifu pointed 
that multilateral dialogue in Asia Pacific would be a vital 
presence contributed to the peace process in the region. 
Therefore, this idea can be initiated by establishing “a vice-
ministerial level conference”.36 
5 June, 2-3 
Satou was invited as a guest speaker and observer to the 6th 
annual meeting of the directors ASEAN-ISIS (Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies) in Jakarta. The ASEAN 
participants and Satou agreed that the time was ripe for 
establishing an Asia-Pacific regional security dialogue. ASEAN 
wanted this dialogue to be an extension of ASEAN-PMC, 
meanwhile Satou suggested using ASEAN-PMC itself. The 
ASEAN-ISIS also suggested setting up a Senior Officials’ 
Meeting (SOM) between ASEAN and its dialogue partners in 
order to prepare an agenda for a new conference. This 
consensus also known as Jakarta Declaration.37 
6 June, 5-7 
Satou was invited to another ASEAN-sponsored conference 
held in Manila. Most of participants of ASEAN-ISIS conference 
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in Jakarta attended this conference. Same consensus 
regarding new ASEAN Asia-Pacific dialogue emerged.38 
7 June, 14 
Nakayama held a meeting with Indonesian President 
Soeharto in Jakarta prior to G7 summit in London. Soeharto 
personally asked Japan to consider the position of developing 
countries during the upcoming G7 summit. In the meeting, 
Nakayama emphasized: (1) Japan’s contribution in military 
field would be confined, (2) The understanding from 
neighbor countries would be one of Japan’s considerations in 
taking any policy. Soeharto responded positively towards 
Nakayama’s statements.39 
8 June, 17 
In a meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas in 
Jakarta, Nakayama officially stated Japan’s will in 
contributing global political role along with its economic 
development. Global political role is defined as non-military 
element. In order to do so,  Nakayama also affirmed that 
Japan will always do a prior consultation with its dialogue 
partner in Asia-Pacific.40 
9 July, 21 
Nakayama held a meeting with Malaysian Foreign Minister 
Abdullah. Both sides agreed to establish EAEG (East Asian 
Economic Grouping).41 
 
ASEAN’s Objections and Qualitative Transactions 
The end of the cold war in Japan was marked as a monumental point where the balance of diplomatic 
transactions and political lobbies performed by Prime Minister and Ministerial-level officials increased 
significantly. This was confirmed by Former Foreign Minister Nakayama during the interview with the 
author42. As described in the previous figures, we can obviously note that Japan, represented by Prime 
Minister Kaifu and Foreign Minister Nakayama have paid some prominent visits to Southeast Asia 
countries. In this analysis section, author will try to connect the quantity of diplomatic transactions prior 
to the Nakayama Proposal July 1991 with the concept of successful integration by Deutsch. 
During year 1990, Nakayama visited Malaysia in January, as well as Thailand and Laos in the beginning of 
August. In Malaysia, the discussion focused on the balance of power in Southeast Asia related to 
Vietnam issues. Meanwhile, Japan addressed economic cooperation and peace process in Cambodia as a 
main notable topic during Nakayama’s visit to Thailand and Laos. In addition, Nakayama had established 
a good amity with Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas when they co-sponsored New York’s informal 
meeting in September. This is also confirmed by Former Minister Nakayama himself during the interview 
session. Moreover, on the year 1991, the balance of transactions doubled within solely six months. We 
can remark that Japan had nine prominent contacts with Southeast Asia countries. Kaifu’s visit to the 5 
ASEAN countries in January to discuss the Gulf War issues as well as Nakayama’s visit to the ASEAN in 
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March for reconstructing diplomacy in Asia Pacific. In the end of April, Kaifu held a discussion with 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir regarding EAEG. In June, Nakayama met Indonesian President 
Soeharto in Jakarta to discuss the role of developing countries in the upcoming G7 summit. In the 
meeting with Alatas, Nakayama stated Japan’s will to discuss any issues related to global political role 
before taking any policies. 
Albeit the aforementioned transactions did not refer to one particular issue of Japan’s Nakayama 
Proposal, there were certain communications between two sides that should be highlighted. First, when 
Kaifu visited Singapore in May, he pointed that a multilateral dialogue would be a vital existence for 
peace management in Asia Pacific. Herewith, Kaifu directly suggested the ASEAN to initiate a forum in 
the scope of vice-ministerial level. As admitted by Former Minister Nakayama, Prime Minister Kaifu 
particularly asked him to focus on strengthening relations with the US, meanwhile Kaifu would take over 
the negotiations with the ASEAN countries. Second, a month before the ASEAN-PMC, Satou was invited 
by ASEAN to Jakarta and Manila conference to discuss the idea of new security dialogue. Here, ASEAN 
side mentioned the concept of the SOM for the first time. Third, Nakayama’s meeting with Alatas in June 
where the statement of “prior consultation” was directed by Tokyo. 
As disclosed by Deutsch, mobility of actors among main sides and multiplicity balance of negotiations in 
the states level are two of the most weigh factors in successful integration. Japan had performed plenty 
of prior diplomacy actions to the ASEAN before submitting the Nakayama Proposal. Prime Minister Kaifu 
and Foreign Minister Nakayama had also visited the countries several times. Theoretically, Japan had 
implemented the findings of Deutsch regarding sufficient quantity of prior negotiations. Subsequently, in 
the frame of multiplicity and balance of transactions, the Nakayama Proposal had fulfilled two main 
requirements such as being a pioneer of the SOM idea as well as balancing over some periods of time in 
performing diplomatic negotiations.However, the ASEAN rejected the proposal carefully. The question is, 
despite the proper balance of transactions and adequate mobility from the actors, why did ASEAN 
negatively reject Japan’s initiative? 
In his findings, Deutsch looked to transactions as the source of new identifications. However, as 
addressed by Adler and Barnett, Deutsch’s emphasis on quantitative measures overlooked the social 
relations that are bound up with and generated by those transactions43. Deutsch completely neglected 
an important factor named a content-quality of transactions underlying the quantitative measures. In 
the case of the Nakayama Proposal 1991, the content-quality is defined as a direct negotiation regarding 
Japan’s most controversial idea of theSenior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and plan to openly submit the idea 
in the near future. Simply put, to answer the question in the previous paragraph, we have to 
considerfourqualitative aspectsby analyzing each content-quality from the major negotiations as per 
following: 
1. Most of Japan’s prior negotiations were dominated by the economic issues, the Gulf Crisis issues 
and the peace process issues in Cambodia and Vietnam. Instead of negotiating the obvious idea 
of regional security forum, Japan affirmed repeatedly in which it would not be a military country.  
2. In his visit to Singapore, Prime Minister Kaifu indeed conveyed his idea regarding a vice-
ministerial level conference to Prime Minister Gou.However, it wasnot the concept of the SOM to 
Malaysia or Indonesia’s officials, which in fact were the most opposing countries towards the 
idea. Moreover, there was no statement from Japan to submit this idea in an open conference 
likewise the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting. 
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3. According to the interview with the author, Nakayama admitted that Japan had performed 
discussions with Indonesia and gained mutual understanding with Alatas prior to the submission 
of the Nakayama Proposal. The statement was indeed clarified in the meeting on June with 
Alatas. However, albeit Nakayama confirmed that Japan would always consult its political role 
with Asia-Pacific partners, it was clear that in this meeting none of the discussion regarding SOM 
concept had taken place. Along with this fact, an article in Indonesian local newspaper even 
assumed that the same line with a slight modification might be used by Japan to China: “We will 
always consult with China”.44 
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As shown by content-quality approach demonstrated above, it is clear that there was no direct 
consultation between Japan and ASEAN countries regarding SOM-related idea throughout 1990 to July 
1991. In sum, we can infer that due to lack of direct consultation regarding the exact issue, it is fair 
enough if the ASEAN eventually rejected the Nakayama Proposal 1991.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite the intensive communication between Japan and the ASEAN countries prior to the submission of 
the proposal, there was no precise discussion related to the specific content of the Nakayama Proposal, 
particularly regarding the Senior Official Meeting (SOM). The absence of SOM-related consultation from 
Japan to the ASEAN countries led negative responds from the ASEAN countries during the Post 
Ministerial Conference, July 1991. Security community theory argued by Deutsch affirms the importance 
of mobility of persons as well as multiplicity and balance of transactions in the process of initiating 
integration among nations. However, the Nakayama Proposal 1991 has proved that in order to achieve a 
well-established security community in the region, multiplicity of diplomatic transactions and the 
content-quality of transactions themselves are equally definitive. 
Former Foreign Minister Nakayama stated that the Nakayama Proposal served as a message to the 
ASEAN countries particularly in accelerating the establishment of a regional forum. Apart from the initial 
purpose carried by the Nakayama Proposal 1991, when it comes to a security policy involving any 
multilateral interests, it is strongly recommended to conduct several precise negotiations with the 
partners so that a prior multilateral consensus can be achieved. This kind of attempt would possibly 
reduce the risk of negative responds as well as negative refusal from the targeted diplomatic partners
